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RECOVERY ALLOWED FOR INJURY
TO NON-VIABLE FETUS
Bennett v. Hymers,
147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958)
Until recently no rule of the common law seemed more firmly
entrenched than that a fetus subsequently born alive could not maintain
an action to recover for prenatal injuries. Clearly enunciated by Justice
Holmes in 1884,1 the rule was recognized and followed by a succession
of cases both in this country' and abroad.3 Harkening to a few dis-
senting voices4 and the instruction of modern medical science,5 the Ohio
Supreme Court boldly initiated a reversal of the rule by its holding in
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,6 permitting recovery by a child
through its next friend for injuries sustained as a viable fetus. In logical
extension of the Williams reasoning the court in the principal case per-
mitted plaintiff to recover for "prenatal injuries inflicted upon it by the
tort of another even [though] it had not reached the state of a viable
fetus at the time of injury."7
The common law rule denying compensation for prenatal injuries
had a dual basis: (1) the defendant could owe no duty to a person not
in existence; and (2) the difficulty of proving the causal connection
1 Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
2 See, e.g., Stanford v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926);
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) ; Newman v. City of
Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo. 126,
154 S.W. 71 (1913); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942);
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co.,
339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 At. 704
(1901); Magnolia Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 121- Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944- (1935);
Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
3 Walker v. Great Northern R.R., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1891).
4 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 II. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900) (dis-
senting opinion); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 463, 26 A.2d 489, 685 (1942)
(dissenting opinion) ; Montreal Tramways v. Le Veille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (Can. 1933).
The court cited with favor Scott v. McPheeters, 93 P.2d 562 (Cal. 1939), dis-
tinguishable from Williams in that it was a case of statutory interpretation.
Curiously, the court overlooked the sole opinion in the United States to have
preceded it in reversing the common law rule. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(D.D.C. 1946).
5 ". . . [M]edical authority has recognized long since that the child is in
existence from the moment of conception. . . ." PROSSER, TORTS § 36, at 174 n.65
(2d ed. 1955), citing HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE §§ 860-975 (1931), and
MALoY, LEGAL ANATOMY & SURGERY 669-87 (1930).
6 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949), 10 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1950), 63 HARV.
L. REV. 173 (1949), 48 MIc. L. REv. 539 (1950).
7 Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (N.H. 1958).
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between negligence and injury would create the danger of a multitude
of fictitious claims.
8
In refuting the first basis of the rule, Williams and similar de-
cisions' emphasized that a viable fetus was capable of independent
existence'0 and thus was a person to whom other persons could owe a
duty of due care. The second basis of the rule, posing merely a problem
of proof, was easily overcome:
• . . [T] he fear that recognition of a right of action in a case
of this character will lead to others brought in bad faith and
present insuperable difficulties of proof should not influence
the decision of the question. It is to be hoped that the law will
keep pace with science. ... 11
The foundation of the rule having been undermined, a series of thirteen
jurisdictions'" adopted the "viability" rule in the decade which followed
the Williams decision.
This calculated refusal to follow the common law rule is a re-
markable demonstration of "judicial application of reason to experi-
ence,"' 3 but it was merely the first of two steps which were totally to
obliterate the rule. The final step was signalled by an appellate court
in Kelly v. Gregory,4 recognized in Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe
8 PROSSER, TORTS § 36, at 174 (2d ed. 1955).
9 See Annots., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953), 10 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1950). See also,
Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950) (wrongful death action).
10 "Viable-Capable of living; especially said of a fetus that has reached
such a stage of development that it can live outside of the uterus." DORLAND,
AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1528 (23d ed. 1957). "Viability is
generally taken to range between the twenty-sixth and the twenty-eighth week of
fetal life." GRADWOHL, LEGAL MEDICINE 834 (1954). "An infant is usually con-
sidered to be viable at the end of seven months of intrauterine existence, but in-
fants may survive if born at an cearlier period." GORDON, TURNER & PRICE,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 760 (1953).
11 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., supra note 6, at 125-26, 87 N.E.2d
at 339. (Emphasis added.)
12 Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio and Oregon;
recovery for prenatal injuries is still denied in seven jurisdictions whose appellate
courts have not reviewed the question since 1946: Alabama, Michigan, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas and Wisconsin. 26 INs. COUNSEL J. 148, 151
(1959). California and Massachusetts have recently reconsidered the problem and
denied recovery. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954)
Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952).
1a "The law of tomorrow . . . will be made as law in living and growing
societies has always been made, by juristic and judicial application of reason to
experience of the administration of justice in the past and testing of that reason
by further experience ... " Pound, Law and Laws, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 453
(1958).
14282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1953).
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Line Co., 5 and forcefully taken by the New Hampshire Supreme Court
in Bennett.'6
In Woods v. Lancet'7 the New York Court of Appeals reversed
its earlier decision in Drobner v. Peters"8 and subscribed to the "viability"
rule. The court specifically confined its holding to "prepartum injuries
to . . . viable children." Thus, Drobner had never been totally dis-
credited when the intermediate court in Kelly 9 permitted recovery for
injuries to a non-viable fetus without mentioning Drobner. Apparently
never having been appealed, the Kelly case is at best uncertain authority.
In the only decision by a state supreme court prior to Bennett to
dispose of the "viability" distinction and permit recovery for injury to
a non-viable fetus, the Hornbuckle0 court relied upon a "viability" case2
and a property case.22 Justice Almand dissented on the ground that the
former was strictly limited to circumstances in which the fetus is
"quick" 23 in the mother's womb. Chief Justice Duckworth, author of
the Tucker opinion, pointed out that it "went as far as sound logic and
legal principles will permit."'2 ' But, ignoring the closely reasoned "via-
bility" distinction enunciated by an unanimous court in Tucker, the
Hornbuckle majority recognized a cause of action in a non-viable fetus
simply by dusting off the old property rule that an infant en ventre sa
mere is "considered as born for all purposes which are for his benefit."2
Kelly and Hornbuckle, although of questionable validity, neverthe-
less heralded the demise of the "viability" distinction-an event urged
by legal commentators.2" It remained for the court in the principal case
15 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
16 Supra note 7.
17 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
SSupra note 2.
19 Supra note 14.
20 Supra note 15.
21 Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951).
2 2 Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535 (1849).
23 Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 506, 93 S.E.2d 727,
729 (1956) (dissenting opinion). "Quick" to the Tucker court meant "when the
child is able to stir in the mother's womb." 208 Ga. at 204, 65 S.E. 2d at 910.
24 Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 505, 506, 93 S.E.2d 728
(1956) (concurring opinion).
25 Morrow v. Scott, supra note 22, at 537. "It is now settled, both in England
and in this country, that from the time of conception the infant is in being for the
purpose of taking any estate which is for his benefit. . . ." 16 Am. JUR. Descent
and Distribution § 81, at 852 n.8 (1938). See also, 26A C.J.S. Descent and
Distribution § 29 (1956).
26 PROSSER, TORTS § 36, at 175 (2d ed. 1955) ; 39 CORNELL L.Q. 542, 545-46
(1954); 63 HARV. L. REV. 173-74 (1949); 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1154, 1157 (1954);
32 NOTRE DAME LAw. 341, 34345 (1957); 3 VAND. L. REv. 282, 296 (1950). But
see 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 115 (1957).
19592
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to face the question squarely." So doing, it (1) adopted the opinion that
the fetus2" becomes a separate organism from the time of conception,
(2) pointed out that its legal existence is recognized by both property29
and criminal law,30 (3) observed that difficulty of proof should not bar
recovery for a wrong if the evidence meets the usual tests required in
tort cases, and (4) concluded that:
In weighing the factors for and against allowing recovery we
are impressed with the injustice of denying to a child born
alive a right to recover for injuries which he might bear for
the remainder of his life because of the tortious conduct of
another.
31
Although speaking of the child's "right to recover," the court
basically is determining that an embryo-fetus possesses an interest which
the law will recognize and protect. Medical science tells the court that
"when the male and female pronucleus meet it is called conception,
and when this occurs life begins."32 Having accepted this teaching33 the
court realizes that the interest for which protection is sought is human
life. Before this, the most jealously protected interest known to the law,
opposing considerations of difficulty of proof and fraudulent claims must
perish.3 4
Wayman G. Lawrence
27 At the outset the court affirmed that a viable child born alive had a cause
of action for prenatal injuries. Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 107, 135
A.2d 249, 251 (1957).
2s The court did not use the term "fetus" precisely. "The word embryo covers
the first three months of life, and fetus is a name for the child in the uterus after
the end of the third month." MALOY, LEGAL ANATOMY AND SURGERY 740 (2d ed.
1955).
29 See note 25 supra.
30 "Without the aid of statutes which now have generally done away with the
requirement that in criminal abortion the woman must be quick with child, and
provide that the crime may be committed upon any pregnant woman, a few
American cases have held that regardless of 'quickening' the offense may be
committed at any time during gestation." 3 BuRDicK, CRIME § 868, at 282 (1946),
citing State v. Reed, 45 Ark. 333 (1885) ; State v. Wilson, 2 Ohio St. 319 (1853)
Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630 (1850).
31 Bennett v. Hymers, supra note 7, at 110.
32 MALOY, supra note 28, at 738. (Emphasis added.) The embryo is regarded
as an entity from the moment of conception. KEITH, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY &
MORPHOLOGY 23 (1921). Neither the mother's blood nor her nerves pass into or
through it. PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 181 (1946).
33 "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). "The inn that shelters for the night is not the
journey's end. The law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow."
CARozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 20 (1924).
34 "It is to be hoped that the law will keep pace with science ... " This
citation from Williams, supra note 11, reveals the common motivation between
that and Bennett. It is clear that the courts, having attacked the common law
rule with the aid of medical science in cases such as Williams, ultimately will
destroy it as they subscribe to the rationale of the principal case.
